

A KRE BTK Szabadbölcsészeti Tanszéke szeretettel vár minden érdeklődőt a

## *Szabadbölcsészeti disputák*

című rendezvénysorozatának előadására:

### Aquinas vs. Buridan on the Immateriality of the Intellect

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Buridan holds the exact opposite of Aquinas's position concerning the knowability of the immateriality (and the consequent immortality) of the intellectual soul. To be sure, both thinkers hold the thesis — which I will also refer to as “the main thesis” —, that the intellectual soul is immaterial. However, while Aquinas provides what he takes to be philosophical demonstrations of this thesis (whence he is committed to holding that the thesis is a philosophically knowable conclusion), Buridan holds that this thesis can not be demonstrated, but can, and must, be held only on the basis of faith. Accordingly, he takes all of Aquinas' alleged demonstrations to be flawed. So, who is right, Aquinas or Buridan? Is the thesis of the immateriality of the intellectual soul a demonstrable conclusion or an indemonstrable article of faith?