[PhilPhys] philosophy of physics in Paris

[Guido Bacciagaluppi]

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

please see below the announcement of a One-day Meeting on Foundations  
of quantum mechanics and quantum information at ENS, Paris, 8 Jan 2010.

Best regards and best wishes for the New Year,
Guido


Guido Bacciagaluppi
Department of Philosophy
University of Aberdeen
Old Brewery
High Street
Aberdeen AB24 3UB
U.K.

Tel.:   +44 (0)1224 272913
Fax:    +44 (0)1224 273750
E-mail: g.bacciagaluppi at abdn.ac.uk
Web: http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/details.php?id=g.bacciagaluppi

G. Bacciagaluppi and A. Valentini, "Quantum Theory at the Crossroads",  
http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521814218

Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,  
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30566/description#description


------------------------------------------------------------

ONE-DAY MEETING:
Foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum information

Friday, 8 January 2010, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Salle Info 1, 10:00-17:30



ORGANISERS:
Anouk Barberousse (IHPST, Paris)
Guido Bacciagaluppi (Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen)



PROGRAMME:

10h : Armond Duwell, Department of Philosophy, University of Montana
Cluster state quantum computers and accounts of computation

11h : Soazig Le Bihan, Department of Philosophy, University of Montana
Bell-type correlations: the hidden causal picture re-assessed

14h30 : Guido Bacciagaluppi, Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
Decohering away the tails problem

15h30 : Alexei Grinbaum, LARSIM, CEA
TBA

16h30 : Commentaries by Alexandre Guay, Université de Bourgogne, and Thomas
Boyer, IHPST




ABSTRACTS:

Armond Duwell, Department of Philosophy, University of Montana
Cluster state quantum computers and accounts of computation

Recently Piccinini (2007) has advocated a set of desiderata for any account of
computation to satisfy:

1.  Objectivity: An account of computation should make it a matter of  
fact which
systems compute a function.
2.  Explanation: An account should explain computers' abilities in  
virtue of the
computations they perform.
3. The right things compute, and wrong things do not.
4. Miscomputation: An account of computation should reveal how  
miscomputation is
possible.
5.  Taxonomy: An account of computation should have the resources to explain
different capacities of different computers.

Piccinini has argued that his functional account of computation that relies
heavily on mechanistic explanation of computational processes satisfies this
set of criteria.

I will challenge Piccinini via an examination of one-way or cluster state
quantum computers.  I will argue that Piccinini's account is too  
closely linked
to standard models of computation.  It recovers our everyday intuitions, but
provides us little reassurance that the account exhausts possibilities for
computation.

My paper will primarily focus on Piccinini's explication of  
desideratum 2. which
focuses on the proper form of a computational explanation.  I will argue that
cluster state quantum computers cannot be explained as Piccinini suggests they
ought to be if they are genuine computers.  I.e. they must manipulate strings
of digits which initially enter into the computational device, persist, and
then exit.  I will suggest that a less restrictive account along the lines of
Copeland's (1996) is called for and argue that it is not in conflict with a
proper construal of the above desiderata.





Soazig Le Bihan, Department of Philosophy, University of Montana
Bell-type correlations: the hidden causal picture re-assessed

Bell-type phenomena are characterized by striking correlations between  
spatially
separated outcome events.  We typically take correlations at the phenomenal
level to be indicative of an underlying causal structure.  Bell-type
correlations are no exception. The received view is that failure of parameter
independence is indicative of an underlying causal relationship but failure of
outcome independence is not. The problem with the received view is  
that it does
not explicitly articulate a notion of causation that can support that view.
Now, there are currently at least three viable theories of causation. I will
argue that the causal structure of Bell-type phenomena varies according to
which theory of causation one considers. My conclusions will be that:  
(1) none of the theories of causation considered support the received  
view, if it is
understood as a strong metaphysical thesis; but (2) the received view can be
rigorously supported if its claims are restricted to the empirical level.



Guido Bacciagaluppi, Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
Decohering away the tails problem

The spontaneous collapse approach to quantum mechanics is often criticised on
the basis that it supposedly does not yield full localisation of macroscopic
objects. The most serious version of this so-called 'tails' problem is that
proposed by Everettians, who argue that the spontaneous collapse does not get
rid of other 'worlds'. I suggest that, instead, the combination of the process
of decoherence (that is normally invoked by Everettians for defining worlds)
with the collapse mechanism will not lead to the formation of other worlds, so
that the tails problem is dissolved.




Alexei Grinbaum, LARSIM, CEA
TBA




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