[PhilPhys] Workshop: Scientific Realism about the Quantum State (Leeds, 9 September)

[Juha Saatsi]

*'Scientific Realism about the Quantum State' – workshop *
9 September 2015

University of Leeds
Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science

This workshop examines recent debates about the nature of the quantum state
(e.g. epistemic vs. ontic conceptions of the quantum state) in the broader
context of scientific (anti-)realism.


*Speakers*:

Simon Friederich (Groningen)
Ruth Kastner (UMD)
Owen Maroney (Oxford)
Chris Timpson (Oxford)

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*Programme*:

9:30 Coffee and Welcome

9:45 – 11:15 Simon Friederich (Groningen)
‘Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach’

11:15 – 12:45 Chris Timpson (Oxford)
‘Realist and Anti-Realist Quantum Theory: The quantum state and explanation’

Lunch

13:45 – 15:15 Ruth Kastner (University of Maryland)
‘Two misconceptions in the usual approaches to realism in quantum mechanics’

Coffee

16:30 – 18:00 Owen Maroney (Oxford)
Title: TBA

18:00 –     Pub and workshop dinner


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*Venue*:

Room G36, Baines Wing, School of PRHS, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT
For directions see
http://www.teachingspace.leeds.ac.uk/building_details.asp?ID=1

There is no registration fee, but please contact Juha Saatsi (
J.T.Saatsi at leeds.ac.uk) by Friday 4th September if you plan to attend or
have any questions about the event.

The workshop is part of the ARHC Scientific Realism and the Quantum Project



*Abstracts:*

Ruth Kaster
(University of Maryland)

‘Two misconceptions in the usual approaches to realism in quantum mechanics’

This talk will identify two misconceptions hampering the discussion of
realism in quantum theory. These are (1) the status of the measurement
problem and (2) typical definitions of 'real'. Concerning (1), it has
become something of a dogma that there is no way to reconcile the unitary
evolution of the wave function with the occurrence of single, determinate
outcomes (apart from ad hoc additions or modifications to the theory, or an
Everettian picture with known serious deficiencies). However, this
predominant pessimistic view has been challenged; the challenge will be
reviewed here. Concerning (2), common definitions of 'real' include
metaphysical presumptions that can and should be dropped, just as previous
metaphysical presumptions, such as absolute space and time, needed to be
dropped in order for progress in physics to be made.



Simon Friederich
(Groningen)

“Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach -- a condensed account”

Can the epistemic conception of quantum states help to dissolve the main
problems in the foundations of quantum theory? I give a tentatively
positive answer to this question, based on a version of the epistemic
conception that acknowledges the notion of a state assignment being
performed correctly while rejecting the notion of a true quantum state of a
quantum system. In addition, I argue by appeal to David Lewis' Principal
Principle that quantum theory is 'locally causal' inasmuch as quantum
probabilities, properly construed, are independent of what occurs at
space-like distance.



Chris Timpson
(University of Oxford)

“Realist and Anti-Realist Quantum Theory: The quantum state and explanation”

In discussing scientific realism and quantum theory, it is important first
of all to distinguish between realism about quantum theory generically, and
the more specific doctrine of realism about the quantum state in
particular. The latter implies the former, but not vice versa. Arguably,
one also needs to make more precise what would be meant by 'quantum theory'
in the first place, before one can begin to talk about being realist (or
otherwise) about it. Any realist approach to quantum theory of course then
faces the two key problems: how it deals with the problem of measurement,
and how it deals with EPR-Bell scenarios. A large part of the motivation
towards anti-realism regarding quantum theory is then the oddity and
apparent bad behaviour of the world described if one takes a realist
approach. Yet the main difficulties for anti-realist approaches are the
main strengths of realist positions: anti-realism about quantum theory
seems to lead one towards a theory too denuded of descriptive content to
underwrite the explanations that quantum theory in fact offers. In this
talk I will review these matters, with a particular focus on the
distinctive anti-realism (about the quantum state, and about the quantum
formalism quite generally) of the quantum Bayesians, or QBists.



Owen Maroney
(University of Oxford)

TBA
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