<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div lang="EN-US" link="blue" vlink="#954F72" style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="color:black;border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh presents, The Sixty-Sixth Annual Lecture Series. This is the Center’s oldest program, it was established in 1960, the year when Adolf Grünbaum founded the Center. Each year the series consists of six lectures, about three quarters of which are given by philosophers, historians, and scientists from other universities. Over the years most of the leading philosophers of science have spoken in this series. </span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Annual Lecture Series,<b> Friday afternoons at 3:30 EST</b>.  Attend in person, Room 1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning or visit our live stream on YouTube at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a>.   </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><br></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="color:black"><br></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="color:black">For more information and abstracts as we receive them, please visit our website: </span><a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/</a><span style="color:black"> </span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><br></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font size="2"><b><a href="https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/persons/andrea-loettgers" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Andrea Loettgers </span></a> </b></font></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">University of Vienna</span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><b><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">September 26th</span></b></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2" color="#000000"><span style="letter-spacing:0.5px">Zoom: </span><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93042700398" style="box-sizing:inherit;border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93042700398</a> </font></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">Title:  </span></span><span style="font-weight:bolder;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Model Templates and Model-Based Unification</span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">Abstract: </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font color="#000000">Contemporary science is increasingly shaped by models that travel far beyond their original disciplinary homes. The Hopfield model, born in statistical physics and reimagined as a neural network, now informs fields as diverse as machine learning, gene regulation, and sociology. Scale-free networks, originating in graph theory and statistical mechanics, capture the hub-like structure of the internet, social networks, cellular metabolism, and citation patterns. The Kuramoto model, developed to study coupled oscillators, now illuminates phenomena ranging from circadian rhythms to power-grid stability.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font color="#000000">These cases exemplify what we call <em style="box-sizing:inherit">model-based unification</em>: the integration of diverse research domains not through universal laws, but through the dissemination and adaptation of shared model templates. Such models unify by functioning as conceptual and computational scaffolds that guide reasoning, reveal regularities, and enable cross-domain inference—while also accumulating differences in meaning and use across contexts.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font color="#000000">Drawing on case studies from physics, biology, and the humanities, this talk examines the epistemic power and risks of this mode of unification. It considers whether network models and other transdisciplinary templates are uncovering deep structural commonalities or simply projecting a familiar mathematical form onto disparate systems. By tracing how models are transformed in new domains, I will argue for a practice-centered understanding of scientific unity—one that embraces diversity and friction as productive forces in building connections across disciplines.</font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font color="#000000">  </font></span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://www.angelapotochnik.com/" style="box-sizing:inherit;border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font size="2" color="#000000"><b>Angela Potochnik </b></font></span></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span style="box-sizing:inherit">University of Cincinnati</span></span> </span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><b><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">October 10^th</span></b></span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"> </span><u></u><u></u></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"> Zoom:  </span></span></font><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94976944388" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14.6667px;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94976944388</a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">               </span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">Title:  </span></span><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><b>Causes Don’t Push</b></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2" color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">Abstract: </span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px"><font size="2" color="#000000">Complex systems research has shown that many systems of different types and at different scales exhibit similar features. These include robust behavioral regularities that can be described without referencing system specifics, variability in how systems accomplish these regularities, and interdependence among system elements. In this talk, I will explore implications of these developments for our very concept of causation. Specifically, I will conjecture that the model of causation as isolated direct influence, like billiard balls, is deeply misleading. The association of causation with pushing, inherited from the mechanistic philosophy that reined in Newton’s day, is reinforced by contemporary science’s experimental practices and causal modeling techniques. Yet, consideration of the uses and limitations of these contemporary techniques supports a different conception of causation, what we might think of as a causal mesh. The persistence of the conception of causation as pushing obscures the expansiveness of causal relevance and, as a result, is virtually inapplicable to the complex systems that comprise our world.</font></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/jonathan-fuller" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Jonathan Fuller </b></font></span></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">University of Pittsburgh</span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">November 14th </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"> </span></span><span><span style="color:black;border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">Title:  </span></span><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><b>A Pragmatic Theory of Diagnosis</b></font></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><br></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><br></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><font size="2"><b>Felipe De Brigard </b></font></span></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font size="2">Duke University</font></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font size="2">January 30th</font></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><span style="color:black;border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in">Title:  </span></span></span></span><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><b>Do Neural Networks Have Functions?</b></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><br></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><b><font size="2">Rina Bliss </font></b></span></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">Rutgers University </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">February 20th </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,Roboto,Arial,sans-serif;line-height:1.2"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font size="2"><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-weight:normal">Title: </span>What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society</font></span></h5><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">  </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><br></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html" style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(20,24,39);border-bottom:1.11111px solid rgb(51,74,255);text-decoration-line:none;letter-spacing:0.5px" target="_blank"><span style="box-sizing:inherit"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><b>Wayne C. Myrvold </b></font></span></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><span style="box-sizing:inherit"><span style="box-sizing:inherit">The University of Western Ontario</span></span> </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">March 20th</span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:1.2"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></span></font></h5><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:1.2"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-weight:normal">Title: </span></span><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">Causality and the Thermodynamic Arrow of Time</span></font></h5><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:1.2"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span style="font-weight:normal">Abstract:</span> </font></span></h5><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">This talk is about two sorts of temporal arrows of time: causal arrows (the causes happen before the effect), and what is called the thermodynamic arrow: the tendency of systems, left to their own devices, to approach thermodynamic equilibrium, and not to depart from it.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">There is extensive discussion in the physical and philosophical literature on the relations between the two arrows. There arguments that causal arrows can be understood in terms of thermodynamic arrows; a thermodynamic arrow is needed for there to be a causal arrow.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">But we can also seek to explain the thermodynamic arrow. One popular avenue approach seeks to explain equilibration in terms of state-counting. Roughly, the idea is: there are simply more higher-entropy states than lower-entropy states, and so we should expect the natural tendency of things is to go from states of lower entropy to higher entropy. These sorts of arguments do not, I will argue, don’t succeed.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">Another, more promising approach, explains the thermodynamic arrow in terms of causation. The difference between states that head towards equilibrium and those would head away from it is that the latter contain conspiratorial-seeming correlations between the states of molecules that are not attributable to common causes. An assumption equivalent to the absence of correlations of this sort lies at the heart, not only of Boltzmann’s derivation of the Boltzmann equation, but also of modern studies of the process of equilibration.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">We seem to have two rival approaches to the relation between the thermodynamic arrow and the causal arrow: one that takes the thermodynamic arrow to be prior, and grounds the causal arrow on the thermodynamic arrow, and one that grounds the thermodynamic arrow on the causal arrow.</font></p><p style="box-sizing:inherit;letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px"><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000">I will argue that these are only apparently rivals; the two arrows should not be thought of as standing in any sort of grounding, or priority relations. The thermodynamic arrow is a condition for the possibility of causal relations, and the causal arrow explains the tendency of systems to equilibrate. This is a vicious circularity only on a conception of metaphysics that, I argue, should be rejected.</font></p><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000"><br></font><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"> </font></span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><font color="#000000"><u></u> </font><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p></div>
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