<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr"><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.8;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)">The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Lunch Time Talks.  Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our live stream on YouTube at <span style="color:blue"><u><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-OWA21298b89-943a-75e2-8eee-9e4d870187e7" title="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" style="color:blue" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a></u></span>.    </div><div style="direction:ltr;margin:0px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:16pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></div><div id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-x_m_-3334168803583952291m_8671757130564799082m_6588461408525047054m_4125393272996218362m_-2211205961369998212m_-1594970769784908183m_5810761170962567598m_2570446183047793778m_-5489186187998458374m_397367357000567001m_-2428511768820842704m_-6897424909836913620m_-3624638712626788390m_-5625453133038190678m_-6277648019630375156m_5422915107825258630m_-3764833216693478172m_6607850884337007589m_-2341060921868922453m_192073903683202698m_-4366808584148716573m_3920387530433489363m_9206680493473021279m_6073136766091579437gmail-x_x_x_x_Signature"><div><p style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.38;margin:0px"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><b>Oron Shagrir</b></span></p><div style="direction:ltr;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:8pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><br></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">Tuesday, October 14 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">This talk will be available online:  Zoom:  </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97226295421" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-LPlnk155177" title="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97226295421" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97226295421</a></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Title: The mathematical objection to artificial (machine) intelligence</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Abstract: </span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">Alan Turing develops the idea of machine intelligence in a series of lectures and papers between 1947 and 1952. In some of them he addresses the mathematical objection (his term) whose gist is the claim that humans can assert some mathematical truths that exceed the abilities of computing machines. We first ask why Turing took so seriously the mathematical objection. After all, even if some humans surpass machines in their mathematical abilities, this by itself does not undermine the project of machine intelligence. Our answer is that the mathematical objection raises a dilemma with respect to Turing’s core claims about machine intelligence and forces him to relinquish at least one of them. We then clarify and discuss Turing’s reply to the mathematical objection, namely, that the machine that plays against the human in the Turing test is not a static machine but an enhanced machine.</span></div><div style="line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">(Joint work with Ben Gershon)</span></div><div style="line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><br></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.8;margin:0px;padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14pt;color:rgb(51,74,255)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt"><b>Amanda Evans</b></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.8;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt">Friday, October 17 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;letter-spacing:0.4pt;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">This talk will be available online:  Zoom: </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95825689559" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-LPlnk628857" title="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95825689559" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95825689559</a></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;letter-spacing:0.4pt;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><b>Title: </b></span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Psychiatric Deep Brain Stimulation and the Ethics of Mechanistic Recovery</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;letter-spacing:0.4pt;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><b>Abstract: </b></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">Direct brain interventions like deep brain stimulation (DBS) raise unique ethical questions when applied to psychiatric disorders. While frameworks like the ethical parity principle suggest that functionally equivalent processes are ethically on par, I argue this view is mistaken in the psychiatric context precisely because it overlooks a crucial distinction: that between agential recovery, guided by the patient’s reasons and values, and mechanistic recovery, which works via a process that bypasses those values. I analyze a spectrum of treatments, using DBS for Parkinson’s disease as a baseline for an agency-restoring intervention, to demonstrate how the ethical stakes shift from case to case. I argue that these stakes become highest in the decision to consent to treatments designed to compel behaviors that bypass the patient’s endorsed values, a choice at the heart of disorders of profound ambivalence such as anorexia nervosa. Ultimately, this presents a fundamental challenge to informed consent that can only be properly understood by foregrounding the ethical difference between agential and mechanistic recovery.</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><br></span></div><p style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.38;margin:0px"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><b>Margaret Farrell</b></span></p><div style="direction:ltr;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:8pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><br></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">Tuesday, October 21 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">This talk will be available online:  Zoom: </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97520433778" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-LPlnk861142" title="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97520433778" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97520433778</a></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Title: </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:bolder">What would imaginary ancestors do?</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:black"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Abstract: </span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">In recent work on human cognitive evolution, several biologists and philosophers have proposed broad, synthetic hypotheses in which they attempt to bring together knowledge from a wide range of disciplines into comprehensive narratives. These hypotheses are historically focused and phylogenetically constrained, their temporal scope makes them well-suited to tracing gradual changes in selective pressures over time, and their sequential causal structure means they need not commit to one sort of cause over another and so can easily incorporate adaptive hypotheses as well as environmental events or developmental constraints.</span></div><div style="line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">But human evolutionary theorists interested in building broad, comprehensive histories face a challenge: an explanatory standard of high causal detail in an area where the ideal sorts of evidence are relatively scarce. Their first response is to cast their net widely: they generally use a wide variety of evidential sources. Then, to maximize detail in the face of limited evidence, theorists employ various epistemic strategies to make the most of the evidence they have. In this talk, I will describe one kind of strategy that theorists use and argue that there is a persistent challenge to making this kind of strategy.</span></div><div style="line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">The strategy is connecting, either functionally within the same organisms or evolutionarily over generations, putative cognitive capacities of ancestral hominins to other cognitive capacities for which material evidence is available. Making these connections involves what I call a <i>close-enough judgment</i>, which, though not formally problematic, constitutes a potential weak point in the construction of human cognitive evolutionary narratives. Sometimes, theorists take certain connections among cognitive capacities to be intuitively plausible – so much so that they accept and include them in their hypotheses. I argue that when they make these plausibility judgments, they are actually attempting (explicitly or implicitly) to reason from the perspective of an ancestral hominin. They reason about whether some inference would be easy, natural, or obvious for a hominin with only a hypothesized set of ancestral capacities. When they do this, they invoke their intuitive sense of ease or obviousness as evidence for the association among cognitive capacities. But such intuitions are systematically misleading, because they are influenced by the very cognitive capacity whose evolution the theorist seeks to explain.</span></div><div style="font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><br></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.8;margin:0px;padding-bottom:10px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:14pt;color:rgb(20,24,39)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt"><b>Melinda Fagan</b></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.8;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt">Friday, October 24 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">This talk will be available online:  Zoom: </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-LPlnk983651" title="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383</a></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><b>Title: </b></span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%;font-weight:700">Explanatory particularism in scientific practice</span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.2;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%"><b>Abstract: </b></span></div><div style="direction:ltr;line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;line-height:150%">I introduce a new approach to studying explanation across the sciences, which I term “explanatory particularism” (EP). EP differs from other philosophical accounts of explanation in taking social aspects of science as primary. Alongside recent defenses of pluralism about explanation, EP rejects the traditional idea that there is one kind of explanation common to all sciences (and everyday life). Instead, multiple styles of explanation flourish in local contexts, intersecting with one another in diverse ways. More radical than other forms of explanatory pluralism, my particularist approach directs philosophers’ attention to often overlooked aspects of scientific practice: interdisciplinary collaboration and conflict, interlinked aspects of understanding, and a pro-social image of science as diverse yet unified. After introducing the particularist approach, I’ll discuss some of its main implications and applications.</span></div><div style="line-height:1.5;margin:0px 0px 16px;font-family:Aptos,Aptos_EmbeddedFont,Aptos_MSFontService,Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);line-height:150%">This talk will be available online (</span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);line-height:150%;font-weight:bolder"><i>it will not be recorded</i></span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(0,0,0);line-height:150%">): Zoom </span><span style="letter-spacing:0.4pt;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:150%"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383" id="m_-1189186268514487795gmail-OWAc4e9fbeb-4980-2579-a593-175e2edb91f3" title="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92610452383</a></span></div></div></div></div>
</div></div>