<div dir="ltr"><span style="color:black;font-family:arial,sans-serif">The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh presents, The Sixty-Sixth Annual Lecture Series. This is the Center’s oldest program, it was established in 1960, the year when Adolf Grünbaum founded the Center. Each year the series consists of six lectures, about three quarters of which are given by philosophers, historians, and scientists from other universities. Over the years most of the leading philosophers of science have spoken in this series. </span><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div lang="EN-US" link="blue" vlink="#954F72" style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"> </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in">The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Annual Lecture Series,<b> Friday afternoons at 3:30 EST</b>. Attend in person, Room 1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning or visit our live stream on YouTube at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a>. </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><br></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><b><font face="arial, sans-serif">Felipe De Brigard</font></b></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard" target="_blank"><font face="arial, sans-serif">https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard</font></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><b><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></b></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><b><font face="arial, sans-serif">January 30 </font></b></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font color="#000000"><span style="letter-spacing:0.5px">Zoom: </span></font></span><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464</a> </font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif"> </font></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><b><font face="arial, sans-serif">Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference</font></b></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif"><b>Abstract:</b> </font></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif">The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate.</font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font color="#000000"> </font></span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"> </span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><a href="https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine" target="_blank"> </a><b><u>Rina Bliss</u></b></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><a href="https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine" target="_blank">https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine</a><b><u></u></b></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><b>February 20th</b> </font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><font color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"> Zoom: </span></span></font><b> </b><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94981603060" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94981603060</a></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font color="#000000" face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"> </span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p><p><b><font face="arial, sans-serif">Title: What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society</font></b></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif"><b>Abstract:</b> </font></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif">Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social consequences. In <i>What’s Real About Race?</i> sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room: what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life chances and health.</font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif"> </font></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></span></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><span style="box-sizing:inherit"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><b>Wayne C. Myrvold </b></font></span></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><a href="https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html" target="_blank"><font face="arial, sans-serif">https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html</font></a></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><b><br></b></span></span></font></p><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span><span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in"><b>March 20th</b></span></span><span style="color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></font></p><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:1.2"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-weight:normal">Zoom TBA</span></font></h5><div><font face="arial, sans-serif"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-weight:normal"><br></span></span></font></div><h5 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;color:rgb(20,24,39);line-height:1.2"><p><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2">Title: “No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific realism</font></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2">Abstract: </font></p><p><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2" style="font-weight:normal">Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades, which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms. Nearly 40 years ago Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible position worthy of that name.</font></p></h5><font face="arial, sans-serif" color="#000000"><br></font><p style="margin:0in;background:white"><font color="#000000"><span><span style="border:1pt none windowtext;padding:0in"><font face="arial, sans-serif" size="2"> </font></span></span><u></u><u></u></font></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><font color="#000000"><u></u> </font><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p></div>
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