<div dir="ltr"><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures will be live streamed on YouTube at </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" target="_blank" style="font-family:georgia,serif">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">. </span><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr"><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br> <br><b>Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord </b> - <a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/<br></a><br>Rescheduled for Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST <br><br><br> <br><b>Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard</b>- <a href="https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard" target="_blank">https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard<br></a><br><b>Friday, January 30 @ 3:30 EST <br></b><br>Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor) <br><br><b>Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference<br>Abstract:</b><br>The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate.<br><br></font></div><div dir="ltr"><font face="georgia, serif" size="4">Can’t make it in-person? </font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">This talk will available online through the following:</span><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"> </font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">Zoom: </span><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464" style="font-family:georgia,serif" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464</a><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large"> and </span><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">YouTube at </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg." style="font-family:georgia,serif" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.</a><div><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br><br><b><br></b></font></div><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b>Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord</b> - <a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/<br></a><br><b>Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST <br></b><br>Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. <br><br><b>Title: Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk<br>Abstract:</b><br>The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error. This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference. These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction. Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction. This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.<br><br></font></div><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4">This talk will be available on Zoom: <a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549" target="_blank"> https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549<br></a><br><br><br><b>Lunch Time Talk - Laura Gradowski</b> -<a href="http://goog_772357827" target="_blank"> </a></font><a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/</a><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br><br><b>Friday, February 6 @ Noon</b><br><br></font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.<span> </span></span><br style="font-family:georgia,serif"><font face="georgia, serif" size="4">Title: TBA<br><br></font><font face="georgia, serif" size="4">This talk will available online through the following:<br> </font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">Zoom: </span><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286" target="_blank"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;text-decoration-color:currentcolor;font-size:14.666667px;letter-spacing:0.5px">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286</span></font> </a> <span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">and </span><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">YouTube at<span> </span></span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg." style="font-family:georgia,serif" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.</a><div></div><br><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br> <br></font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif"><font size="4"><b>Lunch Time Talk - </b></font></span><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b>Kareem Khalifa - </b></font><a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/</a><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br><br><b>Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon<br><br></b></font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.<span> </span></span><br style="font-family:georgia,serif"><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b><br></b></font></div><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b>Title: Causally Modeling the Value-Free Ideal<br><br> </b></font><b><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt">Abstract:</span><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"> </span></b><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;font-size:var(--tec-font-size-4);letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:var(--tec-line-height-2);color:rgb(85,85,85);margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-left:0px"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-size:12pt"><span style="box-sizing:inherit">In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion, discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.</span></span></p><h3 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,Roboto,Arial,sans-serif;line-height:1.2;font-size:1.5em;padding:0px"><span style="font-weight:var(--tec-font-weight-bold);box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt"><font color="#141827">This talk will be available online: </font><font color="#000000"> </font></span><font color="#000000"><span style="font-weight:var(--tec-font-weight-bold);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt;letter-spacing:0.5px">Zoom:</span><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226" target="_blank"><span style="font-weight:var(--tec-font-weight-bold);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt;letter-spacing:0.5px"> </span><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;letter-spacing:0.5px;box-sizing:inherit;text-decoration-color:currentcolor">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226</span></font></a></font></h3><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br> <br><br></font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif"><font size="4"><b>Lunch Time Talk - </b></font></span><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b>David Thorstad - </b></font><a href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/" target="_blank">https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/</a><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br><br><b>Friday, February 13 @ Noon</b><br><br></font><span style="font-family:georgia,serif;font-size:large">Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.<span> </span></span><br style="font-family:georgia,serif"><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><br></font></div><div><font face="georgia, serif" size="4"><b>Title: Procedurally Rational Framing Effects</b></font></div></div></div><div><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><br></span></div><div><font color="#000000"><span style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt">Abstract:</span><br></font></div><div><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;font-size:var(--tec-font-size-4);letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:var(--tec-line-height-2);margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-left:0px"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><font color="#000000">Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.</font></span></p><h3 style="box-sizing:inherit;margin:0px 0px 0.75em;font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,Roboto,Arial,sans-serif;line-height:1.2;font-size:1.5em;padding:0px"><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt;font-weight:normal">This talk will be available online:</span><br></h3><p style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;font-size:var(--tec-font-size-4);letter-spacing:0.5px;line-height:var(--tec-line-height-2);margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-left:0px"><font color="#000000"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt">Zoom:<span> </span><span style="box-sizing:inherit;text-decoration-color:currentcolor"><a href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482" target="_blank">https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482</a></span></span><br style="box-sizing:inherit"><span style="box-sizing:inherit;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:11pt">YouTube:<span> </span><span style="box-sizing:inherit;text-decoration-color:currentcolor"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a></span></span></font></p></div></div>
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