[MaFLa] Reminder: Invitation to two philosophy lectures

[Krisztina Biber]

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to two lectures
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
John Cooper (Princeton University))
on
Chrysippus on Physical Elements

NOTE! Monday!! 26 January,, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412

ABSTRACT
This paper concerns fundamental aspects of the Stoic conception of the
physical world (Stoic cosmology). In Stoic theory, everything there is
is corporeal (there are no "spirits" or "spiritual entities" of the sort
that Platonist philosophy indulges in with abandon). But not all
corporeal things arematerial entities: reason (whether in nature as a
whole, organizing the world at large, or in our own minds and souls) is
a spatially extended thing, able to act on matter, through which it is
extended, but it is not a material thing. I discuss a neglected and not
well appreciated text of Chrysippus, the most important philosopher
among the originators of the Stoic "school" of philosophy, in which he
identifies three usages of the term (physical) "element." One of these
refers to the familiar physical elements of Greek theory: fire, water,
air, and earth (the elements of matter). The other two usages are hard
to figure out, and my focus in the paper is on how to understand these
other two usages.

AND

by
Alberto Voltolini  (University of Turin)
on
The Mark of the Mental

Tuesday, 27 January, 2009, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412

ABSTRACT
I will claim that intentionalism about qualitative states, i.e. the
thesis that qualitative states are identical with or supervene on
intentional states, is incorrect even in its weak form, according to
which qualitative states also have an intentional content. The best way
to argue for intentionalism is to show that qualitative states have the
features that qualify the simplest intentional states, i.e. objectual
states such as Othello’s being jealous of Desdemona or Vladimir’s
looking for Godot, namely the possible nonexistence and the possible
aspectual shape of the intentional object of a state. Yet there are
cases of qualitative states which fail to possess those features. As a
result, if one wants to look for the mark of mental, it is better to
turn one’s eyes away from intentionality.



Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk at ceu.hu 
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