[MaFLa] talk at CEU - A New Version of Quotational Phenomenal Concepts, 12, January, 4, 30 PM

[Krisztina Biber]

The CEU Philosophy Department cordially invites you to a talk 
(as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
by
Martina Fürst (Institut für Philosophie Karl-Franzens-Universität,
Graz) 
on
A New Version of Quotational Phenomenal Concepts

Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 4.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412

ABSTRACT
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered as a powerful response to
anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument, the
explanatory gap or the conceivability argument. The basic idea of this
strategy is to rely on phenomenal concepts which are supposed to explain
why we draw dualistic conclusions from these arguments. Therefore, the
target of this physicalist move is to give a satisfactory account of
dualistic intuitions without being committed to drawing ontological
dualistic conclusions. 
In my talk I start by elaborating the phenomenal concept strategy
concentrating on the knowledge argument. Analyzing Jackson’s
Mary-scenario the crucial particularities of phenomenal concepts are
worked out. Next, I focus on physicalist versions of the so-called
quotational account of phenomenal concepts. I demonstrate that these
accounts fail in explaining the cognitive role of phenomenal concepts.
Subsequently, I propose a new version of the quotational account which
captures the decisive uniqueness and explains the cognitive role of
phenomenal concepts. Finally, I argue that this new account implies
phenomenal referents and hence reinforces anti-physicalism. 



Kriszta Biber
Department Coordinator
Philosophy Department
Tel: 36-1-327-3806
Fax: 36-1-327-3072
E-mail: biberk at ceu.hu
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