[MaFLa] reminder:invitation to two talks on Tuesday, 27 October and on Friday 30 October, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412

[Krisztina Biber]

  The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk 
 (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
 by
 Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)
 on
 Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Confabulatory Explanations
 
 Tuesday, 27 October 2015, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
 
 ABSTRACT
 
 The phenomenon of confabulation is receiving increasing philosophical
attention, and its relationship with self-interpretation and
deliberation in the light of its epistemic costs and benefits are
controversial in the literature. Here I start developing an account of
confabulation that is compatible with the empirical evidence by focusing
on one form of confabulation, that is, confabulatory explanations for
one’s own attitudes and choices.
 
 In section 1 I present one way of understanding confabulation, building
on the existing philosophical and psychological literature on the topic.
In section 2 I consider examples of explanations for one’s attitudes and
choices that can be interpreted as instances of confabulation. In
section 3 I focus on the epistemic costs of confabulatory explanations,
and in section 4 on their potential epistemic benefits. In section 5 I
draw some implications from the previous discussion for debates about
rationality and self-knowledge.
 . 
 
 
  
  
  The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk 
 (as part of its Departmental Colloquium series)
 by
 Daniel Garber (Princeton University)
 on
 Why the Scientific Revolution wasn’t a Scientific Revolution, and Why
it Matters
  
 Friday!!!!  30 October 2015, 5.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412
  
 ABSTRACT
  
 Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions attempts to interpret
scientific change on the model of a political revolution: a period of
normalcy, followed by a crisis, that is resolved by a new regime, a new
paradigm. This essay explores the appropriateness of this model for the
Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. When we examine the
eclipse of Aristotelian natural philosophy, for a long while, if ever,
it was not replaced by a single new paradigm. Rather, the “new”
non-Aristotelian philosophy was actually a diverse group of thinkers,
the “novatores” or “innovators” who agreed only in the rejection of
Aristotelian natural philosophy but otherwise were quite diverse. This
is important not only for understanding the historical period, but also
because it reveals a flaw in Kuhn’s framework. It is important for
political revolutions to be resolved: the stability of the life depends
on it. But there is no reason why a scientific revolution needs to
result in the adoption of a single new paradigm: in the scientific
world, a diversity of competing alternatives, and not Kuhnian normal
science may turn out to be the norm.

  
 
 
    Krisztina Biber
 Department of Philosophy 
 Coordinator
------------------------------------------
 
 Central European University
 Nador u. 9. | 1051 Budapest, Hungary
 Office: + 36.1.327.3806 | biberk at ceu.hu | www.ceu.hu 

  
  



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