[PhilPhys] The Center for Philosophy of Science's - February Talks - All Online and In-Person

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
invites you to join us for our February lectures. All lectures will be live
streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.

*Lunch Time Talk -  **
<https://calendar.pitt.edu/event/ltt-nora-hangel-navigating-publication-bias-reflections-on-knowledge-practices-in-judgment-and-decision-making>**Nora
Hangel*
*Tuesday, February 4th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
In person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning (11th Floor)  or to follow along
via Zoom, use this link:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96604412617

Title: Navigating Publication Bias: Reflections on Knowledge Practices in
Judgment and Decision Making
*Abstract:  *Since the replication crisis impacted experimentally driven
psychological and other sciences in 2010, pre-registration and registered
reports have become more established practices. The talk examines the
effects of these developments on knowledge making processes and on efforts
to counteract publication bias from the perspective of scientists in
Judgment and Decision Making (JDM). One notable consequences of these
changes are that scientists reflect on the different goals publications
have, the standards they expect from each other as epistemic agents, and
the value and confidence levels associated with different types of
knowledge.
I will present preliminary findings on how scientists reflect on various
outlets for communicating valuable contributions to the field, including
openly available resources (e.g., OSF platforms) and peer-reviewed
publications, while advocating for a procedural understanding of knowledge.
The empirical data comes from my current project: The role of scientific
*ju*dgment in generating *know*ledge (JUKNOW, GRF: #500479165,
09/2022-2025) where I study the practice of scientific inquiry, rational
dimensions of knowledge-making practices, and processes of scientific
reasoning in JDM. This social epistemological philosophy of science project
adapts sociological qualitative methods for the use of cognitive
ethnography to answer philosophical questions. The main research questions
in JUKNOW concern how scientists conceptualize situations of epistemic
trust and dependence when uncertainties occur during the processes of
experimenting. How scientists reflect on the conflicting priorities between
producing reliable contributions, accountability in the face of the
conditionality of scientific results, and the need for recognition to
survive academically. In addition, I study the self-correction of science
by analyzing how scientists reflect on the peer-review system and other
forms of self-correction on the individual, the group, and the community
level of science.

*Lunch Time Talk -  * *Alexandre Billon*
*Tuesday, February 11th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
If you are unable to join us in person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning
(11th Floor) use this link to follow along:
*https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91379267711
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91379267711>*

*Title:  Depersonalization derealization disorder: the philosophical take
home message*

*Abstract:  *Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DDD) is a
psychiatric condition characterized by a profound sense of alienation from
oneself and the world. Individuals with DDD may experience a detachment
from their body, actions, and sense of self (depersonalization), a feeling
of unreality in their surroundings (derealization), and even a distorted
perception of time (detemporalization). This intriguing disorder, with its
potential to illuminate the nature of selfhood, time, and reality, has
captivated philosophers since its recognition in the late 19th century,
drawing the attention of luminaries such as Bergson, Sartre, Dilthey, and
Merleau-Ponty.  However, much of the philosophical discourse surrounding
DDD has been fragmented and lacking empirical grounding. This presentation
aims to offer a unified and empirically informed account of the
philosophical insights gleaned from DDD. I will propose that DDD can be
broadly understood as a disruption of subjective perspective, and, perhaps
surprisingly, that it offers a unique opportunity to, at least partially,
vindicate the very nature of subjective experience.


*Lunch Time Talk -  * *Sven Neth*

*Friday, February 14th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
In person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning (11th Floor)  or to follow along
via Zoom, use this link:  *https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93319281376
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93319281376>*

*Title: Against Optimization*
*Abstract:  *Value is complex and hard to measure. So we often measure and
optimize a simplified proxy metric. It’s easy to feel uneasy about this.
For example, Nguyen (2024) describes this phenomenon as “value capture” and
thinks it is bad. Similar phenomena are discussed as “Goodhart’s law” and
“reward hacking”. But it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what is going
wrong here. I will (i) discuss a theorem which attempts to give a general
explanation of why optimizing a proxy metric is bad, (ii) ask whether the
theorem rests on plausible assumptions and (iii) speculate about what this
means for consequentialism, capitalism and various other topics.


*Lunch Time Talk -  * *Christopher Pincock*
*Tuesday, February 18th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
If you are unable to join us in person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning
(11th Floor), use this link to follow along:
*https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93034356038
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93034356038>*

*Title: Explaining the success of models*
*Abstract:  *The traditional defense of scientific realism uses inference
to the best explanation (IBE) to infer some claims about unobservable
entities from the predictive success of some theory. In this talk I
consider how best to adapt this strategy to deal with the problem of
idealized models. In most cases of predictive success, a theory is used to
specify a model and only the model affords a prediction that can be
checked. One problem is that models are typically also specified using
non-theoretical claims, including idealizations that the users of the model
believe are false. So, in what circumstances, if any, can a modeling
success provide evidence that the theoretical claims are true? I argue that
the realist should reconstruct this reasoning in two steps. First, a range
of predictive successes for a model can support the conclusion that the
model stands in what I call a robust representational relationship to its
intended target. This conclusion is obtained through the use of IBE: the
best explanation of the predictive successes of the model is that this kind
of representational relation obtains. Second, given that the model is
specified using some theoretical claims, the best explanation for why the
representational relation obtains may be that these theoretical claims are
true. When this additional condition is met, I argue that the modeling
success can provide evidence for the truth of those claims. I conclude by
engaging with two objections to this revised defense of realism. First, how
should we generate and evaluate potential explanations that involve models
and their relations to some target? Second, how can the best explanation of
some modeling success involve the truth of some theoretical claims when
that modeling success also involves idealizations that are believed to be
false?


Annual Lecture Series -  <https://melaniemitchell.me/> Alyssa Ney
*Friday, February 21st @ 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm EDT*
In person in room 1008 (10th floor) Cathedral Learning  or join online
at: *https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93433720100
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93433720100>*
*Title: Fundamentality of Physics without Completeness*
*Abstract:  *In contemporary philosophy, the fundamentality of physics and
physicalism are typically understood as ontological completeness claims of
some sort. For example, physics is taken to provide a complete
supervenience or realization basis, or a complete set of grounds for all
facts or entities. However, since no formulated physical theory provides a
complete ontological basis for all facts or entities, one must seek an
alternative interpretation if one wants a realistic understanding of the
sense in which our current physical theories are fundamental. The aim of
this paper is to develop such an interpretation, one that bases the
fundamentality of our current physical theories in a claim about their
ontological depth and comprehensiveness. It is argued that this
interpretation of the metaphysical fundamentality of physics is more in
line with the way that physicists regard certain theories as fundamental
than standard philosophical conceptions.


*Lunch Time Talk -  * *Carl Hoefer*

*Friday, February 25th ** @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
In person in room 1117 Cathedral of Learning (11th Floor) or join online at
 *https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93462098921 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93462098921>*

*Title: Natural kinds, laws, and necessities: lessons from post-Twin-Earth
science and philosophy*
*Abstract: *In a paper co-authored by Genoveva Martí, we defended the
Kripke-Putnam thesis that water is *essentially* composed of H2O molecules,
i.e., that there is no world in which the substance we call ‘water’ exists
but is not composed mostly of H2O molecules. But we agree with Putnam that
it can be hard to know what to say about imagined possible worlds in which
the physical (and hence chemical) laws are different in certain ways. In
this talk I will explore some of the speculative ways in which
*physicists *investigate
what would be the case in such counternomic worlds, and how these
speculations interact with the nature of water and other natural kinds, as
well as with powers, dispositions, and other denizens of folk physics and
chemistry. I will use these explorations to motivate some polemical morals
that I believe we should draw in the debates about the metaphysics of laws.



*Lunch Time Talk -  Frederic Jaeck*

*Friday, February 28th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT*
If you are unable to join us in person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning
(11th Floor), use this link to follow along:
*https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94457810768
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94457810768>*

*Title: What is called ‘thinking’ in mathematics?*
*Abstract:*  The starting point of this talk will be the existence of a
dual mode of thinking in mathematics: one that allows us to manipulate
objects according to rules and a game that are co-constructed, and another,
more progressive mode, where the structure dictated by the rules and the
game gives way to much more diffuse and tangled connections.
I will show that these two modes of thinking are in constant and reciprocal
contamination, shaping how mathematicians exercise their force of thought.
This interplay also reveals a certain depth that always accompanies
mathematical propositions, resisting a flat logical interpretation and
offering insight into the very nature of mathematical thinking.
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