[PhilPhys] Next Week's Hybrid Talks - Oron Shagrir - Oct. 14 and Amanda Evans - Oct. 17

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our
Lunch Time Talks.  Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the
Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our live
stream on YouTube at *https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg>*.

*Oron Shagrir*

Tuesday, October 14 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97226295421
Title: The mathematical objection to artificial (machine) intelligence
Abstract:
Alan Turing develops the idea of machine intelligence in a series of
lectures and papers between 1947 and 1952. In some of them he addresses the
mathematical objection (his term) whose gist is the claim that humans can
assert some mathematical truths that exceed the abilities of computing
machines. We first ask why Turing took so seriously the mathematical
objection. After all, even if some humans surpass machines in their
mathematical abilities, this by itself does not undermine the project of
machine intelligence. Our answer is that the mathematical objection raises
a dilemma with respect to Turing’s core claims about machine intelligence
and forces him to relinquish at least one of them. We then clarify and
discuss Turing’s reply to the mathematical objection, namely, that the
machine that plays against the human in the Turing test is not a static
machine but an enhanced machine.
(Joint work with Ben Gershon)

*Amanda Evans*
Friday, October 17 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95825689559
*Title: *Psychiatric Deep Brain Stimulation and the Ethics of Mechanistic
Recovery
*Abstract: *
Direct brain interventions like deep brain stimulation (DBS) raise unique
ethical questions when applied to psychiatric disorders. While frameworks
like the ethical parity principle suggest that functionally equivalent
processes are ethically on par, I argue this view is mistaken in the
psychiatric context precisely because it overlooks a crucial distinction:
that between agential recovery, guided by the patient’s reasons and values,
and mechanistic recovery, which works via a process that bypasses those
values. I analyze a spectrum of treatments, using DBS for Parkinson’s
disease as a baseline for an agency-restoring intervention, to demonstrate
how the ethical stakes shift from case to case. I argue that these stakes
become highest in the decision to consent to treatments designed to compel
behaviors that bypass the patient’s endorsed values, a choice at the heart
of disorders of profound ambivalence such as anorexia nervosa. Ultimately,
this presents a fundamental challenge to informed consent that can only be
properly understood by foregrounding the ethical difference between
agential and mechanistic recovery.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://listbox.elte.hu/pipermail/philphys/attachments/20251009/4f88e66c/attachment.html>