[PhilPhys] Upcoming Lunchtime Talks: Edoardo Peruzzi 10/28, Daniel Wilkenfeld 10/31, Marta Bielinska 11/4, Joseph McCaffrey 11/7

Center for Phil Sci center4philsci at gmail.com
Wed Oct 22 22:13:18 CEST 2025


The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for
our Lunch Time Talks.  Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the
Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our live
stream on YouTube at *https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg>*.

*Edoardo Peruzzi*

Tuesday, October 28 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92468058255
Title: Model Transfer Through Formal Template Accumulation
Abstract:
Contemporary science is increasingly organized around templates (Humphreys
2002, Knuutila and Loettgers 2014). Especially in model-based disciplines,
formal templates (equations, algorithms, network topologies, games, etc.)
are repeatedly used for model construction. An open question concerns the
processes through which new formal templates are developed and subsequently
integrated into the existing repertoire. In this paper, I propose an
account of what I call “formal template accumulation” in science and show
how model transfer can be understood in terms of this accumulation process.
Drawing on a case study from game theory, I argue that formal templates
serve as high-level problem-solving tools, and that their evolving
repertoire underpins model construction and transfer across diverse
scientific fields.

*Daniel Wilkenfeld*
Friday, October 31st @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97872305729
Title: Moral Distress as a Kind
Abstract:
Within nursing (and other healthcare) ethics, researchers often talk about
“moral distress”. However, there is disagreement over how narrowly or
broadly to define the construct, with options ranging from this construct
only applying when someone knows the right action but is prevented from
taking it by external constraints, to being any psychological distress
experienced adjacent to a moral event. In this talk I explore how
philosophy of science (and some other fields) can shed light on this
question, specifically by investigating whether moral distress is best
thought of as a real kind, whether the evolution of moral distress (the
concept) is an example of appropriate open-textured conceptual change, and
whether we should be lumpers or splitters about different phenomena that
could fall under this particular same heading. (Spoiler alert: yes, no, and
splitters.)

*Marta Bielinska*

Tuesday, November 4th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92973594019
Title: Spacetime epistemology in relativistic theories
Abstract:
In physics, each spacetime theory presupposes a specific mathematical space
used as a spacetime model. For example, spacetime in general relativity is
typically considered a (3+1)-Lorentzian manifold that is Hausdorff,
time-orientable, and so on. The choice of one such structure over another
is usually guided by the dynamics, that is, by answering the question: Is
the proposed structure sufficiently rich to account for the physical
entities and dynamical equations of our theories? But how do we ensure, for
example, that no surplus structure is postulated? A straightforward answer
is: through experiment. However, how can we test such spacetime structures
or properties? What are the limitations of such experiments?
This puzzle is not new to philosophy. Historically, the question about the
epistemic access to the spacetime structure has been famously raised, for
example, by Helmholtz (1868, 1896), Reichenbach (1924, 1928), and Poincare?
(1902). More recent contributions include those by Gru?nbaum (1973), Sklar
(1974), van Fraassen (1970), and Dewar et al. (2022). As the authors of the
last article point out, however, this debate has been largely neglected in
recent decades in favor of metaphysical controversies, such as the
relationism-substantivalism debate.
In this talk, I revise spacetime epistemology from an angle of contemporary
physics. Crucially, unlike in the aforementioned discussions on spacetime
epistemology which focus either on metrical structure or on dynamical
equations, I extend the question of testing spacetime properties to
non-metrical spacetime structures, such as topology or differentiable
structure.
Therefore, the aim of this presentation is to examine how to test various
properties of spacetime  at different levels of its structure – such as
orientability at the topological and metric levels – by outlining a
systematic overview of such experiments, focusing on their limitations, and
indicating possible directions for the further development of the
epistemology of spacetime.

*Joseph McCaffrey*
Friday, October 24 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99418139587
Title: Functional Localization in Flux
Abstract:
Since the 19th Century, neuroscientists have fiercely debated the extent of
functional localization in the human brain. But instead of being a passing
phase, debates about functional localization are raging in contemporary
cognitive neuroscience. Some consider functional localization a vital
guiding paradigm for the science while others believe it has outlived its
usefulness. To make matters worse, localizationists and
anti-localizationists do not seem to agree on what a commitment to
localization entails, or what counts as evidence against localization. In
this talk, I present a conceptual analysis of functional localization that
highlights three dimensions or tenets of localization: *structural
specialization*, *localization of function*, and *intrinsicality*. I then
show how this analysis can be used to clarify and advance contemporary
debates about functional localization in cognitive neuroscience.
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