[PhilPhys] The Center for Philosophy of Science's Upcoming Hybrid Talks

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.

*Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard*-
https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard


*Friday, January 30 @ 3:30 EST *
Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)


*Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal InferenceAbstract:*
The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary
philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate
is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of
memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a
simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper
seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one
is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism
is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering
I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation
central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it
features in the causalism/simulationism debate.
Can’t make it in-person?
This talk will available online through the following:
 Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464 and  YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.



*Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord*  -
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/


*Tuesday, February 3rd @ 12:00 EST *
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.


*Title: Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of
Inductive RiskAbstract:*
The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of
induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept
an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into
account the costs of error.  This chapter argues that the gap argument is
sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of
inductive inference.  These assumptions are tendentious and have been
rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction.  Using the HUD audit study
of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and
combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social
epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence
proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a
gap-free account of induction.  This account throws new light onto the
phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and
should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving
up impartiality.

This talk will be available  on Zoom:   https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549



*Lunch Time Talk - Laura Gradowski* -  <http://goog_772357827>
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/gradowski-laura/

*Friday, February 6 @ Noon*

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.
Title: TBA

This talk will available online through the following:
 Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91084235286> and  YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.



*Lunch Time Talk - **Kareem Khalifa - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/khalifa-kareem/



*Tuesday, February 10 @ Noon*Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th
floor of the Cathedral of Learning.



*Title: Causally Modeling the Value-Free Ideal **Abstract: *

In science-and-values discussions, the value-free ideal (VFI) is sometimes
glossed as the thesis that non-epistemic values’ influences on scientific
reasoning are never legitimate. Although “influence” is a causal notion,
discussions of the VFI have not engaged the vast literature on causal
modeling. In this paper, I propose some useful ways in which causal models
can be used to sharpen this variant of the VFI. Doing so reveals
underappreciated burdens of proof in debates about the VFI.
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226 <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93125716226>


*Lunch Time Talk - **David Thorstad - *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/thorstad-david/

*Friday, February 13 @ Noon*

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning.

*Title: Procedurally Rational Framing Effects*

Abstract:

Framing effects are often taken as paradigmatic examples of human
irrationality. The irrationality of framing effects is then used in
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions. I argue
that many framing effects are procedurally rational in the sense that they
result from rational processes of practical inquiry. I make this argument
through case studies of category-based choice, list-based choice, and
salience-driven decision making. I conclude by showing how the procedural
rationality of framing effects can be used to resist framing-based
debunking arguments against moral and philosophical intuitions.
This talk will be available online:

Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96218362482
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
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