[PhilPhys] The Center for Philosophy of Science's Upcoming Lectures - Hybrid

Center for Phil Sci center4philsci at gmail.com
Fri Sep 25 22:23:28 CEST 2026


The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All lectures will be
live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.

 *Lunch Time Talk:*  Mike Hicks
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/hicks-michael/

Meet Mike Hicks, Visiting Fellow at The Center for Philosophy of
Science. Mike's
5 Minute Video: https://youtu.be/dsJKE8f8jFU
Tuesday, September 29 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97060068493>https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94260602832
*Title: *Pragmatic Realism about Modality, Natural and Metaphysical
*Abstract: *
Modal notions—which deal with necessity, possibility, and counterfactually
robust conditionals–are central to our explanatory, predictive, and
practical decision-making activities. In this talk, I will focus on two
distinct types of modality: first, natural modality, the sort associated
with causation, laws of nature, and scientific explanation; and second,
metaphysical modality, of the sort associated with essences, semantic
externalism, and grounding explanation. I will present and defend a
first-order realist, higher-order pragmatist view of these modal notions.
On this view, modal notions are backed by real, in the world relations:
invariant regularities in the case of natural modals, and identity-like
relations in the case of metaphysical modals. What makes these relations
modal, however, are facts about our inferential practices. A relation is
modally robust, on this view, just in case (and because) it is suitable to
back a pattern of truth-conducive deductive inferences. I argue that this
higher-order pragmatic explanation of the modality of these relations
doesn’t challenge the view’s first-order realism,  but does provide the
view with the resources to solve some of realism’s more intractable
normative and epistemic problems.


*Featured Former Fellow:  **Jessica Pfeifer  *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/pfeifer-jessica/
Friday, October 2nd @ 12:00pm EST

*Online Only*  -   <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91318992513>
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91318992513

*Title: An Alternative Account of Objective Probabilities in Evolution*

*Abstract:*
Strevens, Abrams, and Rosenthal have independently developed accounts of
objective probability consistent with determinism grounded in the theory of
arbitrary functions. In this talk, I focus on Strevens’ way of developing
and describing the approach in terms of microconstancy and
macroperiodicity. These accounts face (at least) two major problems: (1)
the problem of initial conditions; and (2) the question of whether systems
studied by scientists satisfy the conditions required for these accounts to
work, in particular whether the systems are microconstant and macroperiodic.
The aim of the talk is to outline an alternative account of physical
probability in a deterministic system that is grounded in the dynamics of
that system, without requiring that the system is microconstant or
macroperiodic, and without being dependent on the actual distribution of
initial conditions in some form or other. Like Strevens, Abrams, and
Rosenthal, I think objective probabilities in deterministic systems can be
grounded in facts about the dynamics of the actual world. However, I argue
that we should separate out what these facts entail about what would happen
over a large class of possible outcomes from what happens in a large class
of actual events. Physical probability first and foremost tells us about
the former. We can only make inferences about the latter with additional
assumptions or information (such as microconstancy, macroperiodicity, and
facts about initial conditions). However, as I will show, the lack of the
latter does not entail that objective probabilities have no significant
role to play in science. I focus specifically on the use of probabilities
in evolutionary theory. Based on an account I develop elsewhere, I argue
that probabilities allow biologists to represent the causal difference
between natural selection and random genetic drift, and that this has
implications for what would happen over possible (and perhaps non-actual)
conditions. Moreover, this allows us to distinguish different roles that
probabilities can play in science and what is required for each. Some of
these roles might require microconstancy and macroperiodicity, but others
do not. The aim of the talk is to argue that there is a role that objective
probabilities can play even when a system is not microconstant or
macroperiodic.


*Lunch Time Talk:  **Aditya Jha  *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/jha-aditya/
Tuesday, October 6th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST
Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning
This talk will be available online:  Zoom: :
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/98055239588
*Title:  The Anatomy of Thermal Equilibrium and Fluctuation Theorems*
*Abstract:*
In this talk, I explore the relationship between various fluctuation
theorems and the Second Law in statistical thermodynamics and argue against
a commonly held perception, namely that fluctuations somehow constitute a
"violation" of the Second Law. I instead suggest that the Second Law
restricts the statistical form of fluctuations not only in equilibrium
regimes but also in far-from-equilibrium regimes. This restriction, I show,
emerges from the anatomy of statistical (thermal) equilibrium, which,
properly understood, is a conjunction of three conditions: the stationarity
of an ensemble, its detailed balance, and a compositional condition on
energies and probabilities, grounded in the operational content of the
Second Law, that forces probability to be logarithmically linear in energy.
I demonstrate how fluctuation theorems exploit this anatomy: in equilibrium
through the global detailed balance of the system itself, and in
far-from-equilibrium regimes through local detailed balance, a condition
that the thermal environment imposes locally on a system's coarse-grained
transitions without the system itself being in equilibrium.


Annual Lecture Series:  Serife Tekin   <http://goog_1722349669>
https://www.serifetekin.org/

Friday, October 9th @ 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm EDT

Attend in person, Room 1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning

Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/92460514803

*Title: * Stability and Intervention in Psychiatry
*Abstract: *
Psychiatry is often described as a methodologically unstable or fragmented
science, given its reliance on heterogeneous explanatory frameworks ranging
from neuroscience and psychopharmacology to narrative, phenomenological,
and patient-centered approaches. Philosophical critiques of psychiatry’s
scientific standing frequently treat this heterogeneity as a liability,
suggesting that without stable objects of inquiry or unified classificatory
kinds, psychiatry cannot meet the explanatory and interventionist standards
typically associated with mature science. This talk challenges that
assumption by reconsidering what *stability* should mean in the context of
psychiatric inquiry. Rather than treating stability as a property of
diagnostic kinds or underlying mechanisms, I suggest that it is more
productively understood as something achieved through scientific and
clinical practice. Drawing on work on scientific intervention, disunity,
and the interactive nature of human kinds, I argue that psychiatry’s
epistemic success does not depend on discovering fixed natural kinds, but
on its capacity to generate locally reliable forms of explanation,
prediction, and intervention. More broadly, this perspective suggests that
psychiatric stability is achieved through interventions that engage persons
as reflective, interactive, and socially embedded targets of scientific
practice.
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