[PhilPhys] Upcoming Lunch Time Talks by Joseph Wilson 12/1 - Haixin Dang 12/4 - John D. Norton 1/15
Center for Phil Sci
center4philsci at gmail.com
Fri Nov 20 16:08:19 CET 2026
The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our
upcoming Lunch Time Talks. Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor
of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our
live stream on YouTube at
*https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg*
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg>.
*Lunch Time Talk: *Joseph Wilson -
https://sites.google.com/view/josephwilsonphilosophy/home-and-cv
*Tuesday, December 1st @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST*
Zoom: <https://pitt.zoom.us/j/98622170239>https://pitt.zoom.us/j/98622170239
*Title: How Games Help with Values Pluralism and the Value-Free Ideal*
Abstract:
In this talk I consider one way that scientific practice can properly
privilege epistemic aims and values while accommodating the denial of the
value-free ideal (Douglas 2009) and values pluralism more generally.
Philosophers have not only argued that research aims and practices are
constrained by ethical values, but that they are irreducibly aesthetic
(Turner 2019), and often practical (Parker 2020, Watkins 2024). From this
pluralism, two problems arise – it is unclear in what sense science is a
distinctly epistemic practice, and it is unclear how epistemic aims and
values are properly insulated from trade-offs. Toward a solution, I sketch
an understanding of scientific agency shaped by insights from the
philosophy of games (Nguyen 2020). The proposed agency structures the
practical activity of researchers such that acknowledged forms of values
pluralism hold while maintaining a special place for epistemic aims.
*Lunch Time Talk: *Haixin Dang - https://www.haixindang.com/
*Friday, December 4th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST*
Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97822992604
*Title: **Transparency and Its Discontents: Rethinking Openness in
Scientific Institutions*
Abstract:
Transparency has become a central ideal in contemporary scientific
governance. The Open Science movement, in particular, promotes the
disclosure of research data, methods, code, and other materials as a means
of improving scientific reliability, accountability, and public trust.
Underlying these initiatives is the assumption that making scientific
practices more visible will improve their epistemic performance. In this
paper, I challenge a largely unexamined assumption behind this ideal: that
transparency allows us to observe scientific practice without substantially
changing the practice being observed. Drawing on recent work in political
philosophy and social epistemology, I argue that transparency is not merely
a mechanism for making information available but an institutional
intervention that reshapes the production and communication of scientific
knowledge. I identify three mechanisms through which this occurs:
transparency changes researchers’ incentives, transforms the practices
through which information is produced and documented, and redistributes
epistemic labor and resources. I develop this argument through an
examination of scientific data-sharing policies, where formal commitments
to openness frequently fail to produce meaningful access to research data.
I suggest that these difficulties reflect not only problems of compliance
but also a deeper tension between demands for transparency and the
practical conditions of scientific inquiry. I conclude that the epistemic
value of transparency must be assessed in relation to the institutional
changes it requires. Opacity should not always be interpreted as evidence
of misconduct or institutional failure; sometimes it reflects the practical
and epistemic conditions under which scientific knowledge is produced.
*WINTER BREAK*
*Lunch Time Talk: *John D. Norton -
https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/jdnorton.html
*Friday, January 15th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST*
Zoom: TBA
*Title: **small-e empiricism*
Abstract:
The core idea of empiricism is that experience, and it alone, has the
unique capacity to inform us of contingent truths of the world. small-e
empiricism is a formulation of empiricism designed to conform with the
empiricism of modern science. It abandons the inductive skepticism of Big-E
Empiricism; generalizes experience to include instrumental recordings; and
replaces the idea of experience as an excitation of human sense organs with
that of a physical process that connects us continuously with the system of
interest.
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