CFP: LSE-Pittsburgh conf. on "Confirmation, Induction and Science"

[S.Hartmann at lse.ac.uk]

Confirmation, Induction and Science

Three-day conference at the London School of Economics, 8-10 March 2007

The conference is a joint conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, and LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)

Conference website: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/events/Conferences/ConfirmationInductionandScience/Confirmation2007.htm

Deadline for submissions: 1 October 2006

A few travel bursaries for graduate students are available. We also offer an award of US$ 500 for the best submitted paper by a graduate student.

Keynote speakers: Philip Dawid (University College London) and Malcolm Forster (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

Organisers: Stephan Hartmann (LSE) and John Norton (University of Pittsburgh)

Programme committee: Nancy Cartwright (LSE), Philip Dawid (University College London), Branden Fitelson, (University of California, Berkeley), Malcolm Forster (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Allan Franklin (University of Colorado, Boulder), Stephan Hartmann (LSE), John Norton (University of Pittsburgh), Jon Williamson (University of Kent), and John Worrall (LSE) 


What distinguishes science from all other human endeavours is that the accounts of the world that our best, mature sciences deliver are strongly supported by evidence and this evidence gives us the strongest reason to believe them. While this is the distinctive mark of science, unanimity has still to emerge among philosophers of science about the logic of confirmation and induction used to relate evidence to science. The state of these logics stands in stark contrast to that of deductive logic, where there is essentially no dispute over which are the good systems of deductive logic. Opinions on confirmation and induction diverge wildly in philosophy of science. At one extreme are those such as the Bayesians or learning theorists, who believe that the true system of inductive logic has been found and all that needs to be resolved are the details. At the other are skeptics, such as some supporters of the underdetermination thesis, who hold that no logic can vindicate the level of support scientists claim for their best, mature theories, for, they urge, the real inductive import of evidence cannot be that decisive. Between these extreme are many intermediate positions, including the view that the very nature of inductive inference remains poorly understood.

Our goal in this conference is to bring together representatives from as many of these viewpoints as possible in order to advance our understanding of this problem. The conference will encourage contributions from philosophers of science with both systematic and critical perspectives as well as papers that develop revealing case studies in science.


The conference is generously supported by the Centre for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, and the Mind Association.


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Stephan Hartmann          
http://www.stephanhartmann.org
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