[PhilPhys] Oxford Philosophy of Physics Seminars this term

[Chris Timpson]

Dear All,

 

The Oxford Philosophy of Physics seminar will, as usual, meet this term on
Thursdays at 4.30pm in the Lecture Room at 10 Merton St. The schedule is as
follows (speakers’ affiliation is Oxford unless otherwise stated):

 

1st Week (29 April) Alastair Wilson “Metaphysics in light of Everettian
Quantum Mechanics”

 

2nd Week (6 May) Andreas Doering “Some basics of the topos approach to the
formulation of physical theories”

 

3rd Week (13 May) Keith Hannabuss “Some recent developments in Quantum
Electrodynamics”

 

Abstract: This talk will review the history of electrodynamics and the
problem of divergences, together with some of the more recent ideas on how
those can be tamed. It will not assume any detailed knowledge of QED.

 

4th Week (20 May) Harvey Brown “Boltzmann’s H-theorem and its discontents”

 

Abstract: A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility)
and Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its
simplified variant in the Ehrenfests' 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited
1896 (measure-theoretic) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument
due to Poincaré) is also analysed. Significant differences between the
objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions
concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. Particular emphasis is
given to the radical nature of Poincaré's and Zermelo's attack, and the
importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to the
objections taken together.

 

5th Week (27 May) Nancy Cartwright (LSE) “Who’s afraid of external
validity?”

 

6th Week (3 June) Darrell Rowbottom “Confirmation and the intersubjective
interpretation of probability”

 

7th Week (10 June) David Wallace “The logic of the Past Hypothesis”

 

Abstract: I attempt to get as clear as possible on the chain of reasoning by
which irreversible macrodynamics is derivable from time-reversible
microdynamics, and in particular, to clarify just what kinds of assumptions
about the initial state of the Universe, and about the nature of the
microdynamics, are needed in those derivations. I conclude that while a
“Past Hypothesis” about the early Universe does seem necessary to carry out
such derivations, that Hypothesis is not correctly understood as a
constraint on the early Universe’s entropy.

 

8th Week (17 June) Adam Caulton (Cambridge) “Interpreting physical theories
with symmetries”

 

Best wishes,

 

CGT and HRB

 

 

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