[PhilPhys] Lunch Time Talks -Marian J.R. Gilton 1/23 and Laura Kate Matthews 1/26

[Center for Phil Sci]

 The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Lunch Time Talks.  Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our live stream on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.


LTT -  Marian J.R. Gilton<https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/marian-jr-gilton>

Tuesday, January 23 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST

Title: Where counting counts: Supporting a particle interpretation of particle physics

Abstract: There is a general consensus among philosophers of physics that quantum field theory (QFT) does not admit of a particle interpretation, and that, therefore, the actual phenomena in the world studied by particle physics does not include any particles–at least, not fundamentally.  This seems to put QFT in tension with both experimental and theoretical particle physics, as these latter two make frequent appeals to the notion that, not only do particles exist, but they are the basic objects of study. Subsequent philosophical research has sought to address this tension by developing accounts of emergent particles, or by recovering particles in the classical limit of QFT, or by otherwise explaining how our talk of particles is a useful fiction. In this talk, I will turn to reassessing the implications of the original results showing that QFT does not admit of a particle interpretation. I will focus on the issue of counting distinct particle states in interacting QFT. I will argue that there is actually very little tension between what interacting QFT on the one hand, and theoretical and experimental particle physics on the other, have to say regarding the conditions under which we can count distinct particle states.

 This talk will available online with the following Zoom link, found here: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96466973345


LTT – Laura Kate Matthews<https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/laura-matthews>

Friday, January 26 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST

Title:  Delusions as Cognitive-Affective Complexes

Abstract: Delusions are defined in the DSM-5 as “beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th edition). In this talk, I offer two criticisms of this definition: 1) the concept is too broad in that everyday forms of self-deception and irrationality qualify as delusions and 2) the concept treats delusions as purely “cognitive” phenomena, which obfuscates the affective content of delusional thinking. I use these criticisms to motivate an enactive approach to delusion. I draw specifically on three features or commitments of enactivism: 1) the claim that cognition is essentially a process of adaptively navigating or “making sense” of one’s environment, including the social world, 2) the thesis that all cognition is inherently affective and 3) a dynamic systems approach to modeling delusional processes. The approach I sketch leads to the conclusion that delusions are cognitive-affective complexes which inhibit adaptive agency in a social context. If time allows, I will raise (and perhaps answer) the question of whether collective delusions (such as the belief that devil-worshipping, cannibalistic pedophiles are somehow running the world) are properly understood as delusions in the psychiatric sense.

 We are also streaming the talk through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96920232214
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