[MaFLA] Call for Papers "The Legacy of the Value-Free Ideal of Science"

[Ádám Tuboly]

Kedves Kollégák,

hadd ajánljam figyelmükbe, figyelmetekbe az alábbi különszám felhívását!

Üdvözlettel,

Tuboly Ádám
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Leader of Research Group, MTA Lendület "Values and Science"
Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
/ Research Fellow, Institute of Transdisciplinary Discoveries
Medical School, University of Pécs
https://sites.google.com/view/valuepolarizations

Call for Papers

Topical Collection of Synthese: „The Legacy of the Value-Free Ideal of
Science”

Guest Editors:

Philippe Stamenkovic
(a) Jacques Loeb Center for the History and Philosophy of the Life
Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel)
(b) MTA Lendület Values and Science Research Group
philippe.stamenkovic at icloud.com

Adam Tamas Tuboly
(a) MTA Lendület Values and Science Research Group
(b) Institute of Transdisciplinary Discoveries Medical School, University
of Pécs tubolyadamtamas at gmail.com

Topical Collection Description:

Until the end of the 20th century, the value-free ideal (VFI) of science,
according to which non-epistemic values should not have any influence on
the epistemic phase of scientific inquiry (where hypotheses are accepted or
rejected), was the dominant view among philosophers and especially
scientists. However, in the last decades, the value-laden ideal (VLI)
progressively became the new “received view” in the philosophy of science.
But the VLI raises difficulties, and in fact, the question of
(non-epistemic) values in science remains controversial, at least for the
epistemic phase (for the pre-epistemic phase where research questions are
formulated, and post-epistemic phase where results are communicated and
applied, the influence of non-epistemic values is generally acknowledged
and not controversial). There are important unfinished questions, some of
which are empirical, but some of which are also normative, such as which
values can or should influence science, and how they are allowed to do so.
Besides particular (and influential) attempts, a general view of the role
of values in science is rarely presented.

The current VLI proposals are often too complicated (designed on a
case-by-case basis) and/or potentially ambiguous (when conflicting goals
lead to different values and corresponding scientific claims); they
conflict with the own views of many scientists and members of the general
public (scientists in general, and many within the public and government
panels, still tend to follow and emphasize the VFI); and they do not
guarantee the epistemic integrity of science (hence maintaining the
suspicion of wishful thinking). The question is still open whether there
are any legitimate terrains where the VFI is a possible or more desirable
option.

This problematic state of affairs gives rise to a confused image of science
in the mind of scientists, policy-makers and the general public, which can
have a negative impact on the trust people put in science. Worse, such
unsettled debate can be used by science deniers to support their
undermining enterprise.

The concern to protect the integrity of science is, in turn, a (partial)
rehabilitation of the VFI, whose central philosophical motivation and
demand is the preservation of the epistemic integrity of science (in order
to avoid wishful thinking). Thus, in order to overcome our current
predicament, we need to understand what we can learn from the VFI, and why
people still deem it important today: why, in a nutshell, it still has some
relevance in some way. To do so, we can look both backwards and forwards,
with the following possible topics for this topical collection:

• How did the VFI come about, how was it progressively replaced by the VLI,
and what is left of it from the historical and social point of view?

• How can we understand today the importance of the VFI in the public image
of science, the implications of its demise on the public trust in science,
and the dangers represented by the VLI (e.g. with respect to conspiracy
theories)?

• What possible ways could we imagine to incorporate the fundamental
insight of the VFI, namely the preservation of the integrity of science,
while incorporating the influence of values in the most simple, systematic
and coherent way?

• As science progresses, do new values surface among the relevant and
respected non- epistemic values which already influence science?

• Does the VFI have any local and geographical dimension, or it is a
universal idea?

• What are the forms and fields of science most susceptible to the VFI?
Any other topics related to the VFI and VLI are also welcome. As emphasized
above, submitted papers shall focus on science and values, from a
philosophical, historical, sociological or integrated perspective.

Invited contributors:

Jordi Cat (Indiana University), Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (Cornell
University), Heather Douglas and T.Y. Branch (Michigan State University and
Universitat Köln), Kevin Elliott (Michigan State University), Sven Ove
Hansson (Stockholm University), Kristen Intemann (Montana State
University), Janet Kourany (University of Notre Dame), Kristina Rolin
(University of Helsinki).

Manuscripts shall be submitted via Synthese’s online system (
https://www.editorial- manager.com/synt/default.aspx), under the adequate
topic collection heading, “The Legacy of the Value-Free Ideal of Science”.
The deadline for submission is March 15, 2023.

For further information, please contact the guest editors: Philippe
Stamenkovic (philippe.stamen- kovic at icloud.com) or Adam Tamas Tuboly (
tubolyadamtamas at gmail.com).

https://www.springer.com/journal/11229/updates/23246308
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