[PhilPhys] 66th Annual Lecture Series - 9/26 Andrea Loettgers and 10/10 Angela Potochnik

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
presents, The Sixty-Sixth Annual Lecture Series. This is the Center’s
oldest program, it was established in 1960, the year when Adolf Grünbaum
founded the Center. Each year the series consists of six lectures, about
three quarters of which are given by philosophers, historians, and
scientists from other universities. Over the years most of the leading
philosophers of science have spoken in this series.



The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Annual
Lecture Series,* Friday afternoons at 3:30 EST*.  Attend in person, Room
1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning or visit our live
stream on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.



For more information and abstracts as we receive them, please visit our
website:
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/events-and-more/annual-lecture-series/




*Andrea Loettgers
<https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/persons/andrea-loettgers> *

University of Vienna

*September 26th*

Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93042700398



Title:  Model Templates and Model-Based Unification

Abstract:

Contemporary science is increasingly shaped by models that travel far
beyond their original disciplinary homes. The Hopfield model, born in
statistical physics and reimagined as a neural network, now informs fields
as diverse as machine learning, gene regulation, and sociology. Scale-free
networks, originating in graph theory and statistical mechanics, capture
the hub-like structure of the internet, social networks, cellular
metabolism, and citation patterns. The Kuramoto model, developed to study
coupled oscillators, now illuminates phenomena ranging from circadian
rhythms to power-grid stability.

These cases exemplify what we call *model-based unification*: the
integration of diverse research domains not through universal laws, but
through the dissemination and adaptation of shared model templates. Such
models unify by functioning as conceptual and computational scaffolds that
guide reasoning, reveal regularities, and enable cross-domain
inference—while also accumulating differences in meaning and use across
contexts.

Drawing on case studies from physics, biology, and the humanities, this
talk examines the epistemic power and risks of this mode of unification. It
considers whether network models and other transdisciplinary templates are
uncovering deep structural commonalities or simply projecting a familiar
mathematical form onto disparate systems. By tracing how models are
transformed in new domains, I will argue for a practice-centered
understanding of scientific unity—one that embraces diversity and friction
as productive forces in building connections across disciplines.





*Angela Potochnik * <https://www.angelapotochnik.com/>

University of Cincinnati

*October 10th*

 Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94976944388



Title:  *Causes Don’t Push*

Abstract:

Complex systems research has shown that many systems of different types and
at different scales exhibit similar features. These include robust
behavioral regularities that can be described without referencing system
specifics, variability in how systems accomplish these regularities, and
interdependence among system elements. In this talk, I will explore
implications of these developments for our very concept of causation.
Specifically, I will conjecture that the model of causation as isolated
direct influence, like billiard balls, is deeply misleading. The
association of causation with pushing, inherited from the mechanistic
philosophy that reined in Newton’s day, is reinforced by contemporary
science’s experimental practices and causal modeling techniques. Yet,
consideration of the uses and limitations of these contemporary techniques
supports a different conception of causation, what we might think of as a
causal mesh. The persistence of the conception of causation as pushing
obscures the expansiveness of causal relevance and, as a result, is
virtually inapplicable to the complex systems that comprise our world.





*Jonathan Fuller * <https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/jonathan-fuller>

University of Pittsburgh

November 14th

 Title:  *A Pragmatic Theory of Diagnosis*



*Felipe De Brigard * <https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard>

Duke University

January 30th

Title:  *Do Neural Networks Have Functions?*




*Rina Bliss *
<https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine>

Rutgers University

February 20th
Title: What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society




*Wayne C. Myrvold * <https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html>

The University of Western Ontario

March 20th

Title: Causality and the Thermodynamic Arrow of TimeAbstract:

This talk is about two sorts of temporal arrows of time: causal arrows (the
causes happen before the effect), and what is called the thermodynamic
arrow: the tendency of systems, left to their own devices, to approach
thermodynamic equilibrium, and not to depart from it.

There is extensive discussion in the physical and philosophical literature
on the relations between the two arrows. There arguments that causal arrows
can be understood in terms of thermodynamic arrows; a thermodynamic arrow
is needed for there to be a causal arrow.

But we can also seek to explain the thermodynamic arrow. One popular avenue
approach seeks to explain equilibration in terms of state-counting.
Roughly, the idea is: there are simply more higher-entropy states than
lower-entropy states, and so we should expect the natural tendency of
things is to go from states of lower entropy to higher entropy. These sorts
of arguments do not, I will argue, don’t succeed.

Another, more promising approach, explains the thermodynamic arrow in terms
of causation. The difference between states that head towards equilibrium
and those would head away from it is that the latter contain
conspiratorial-seeming correlations between the states of molecules that
are not attributable to common causes. An assumption equivalent to the
absence of correlations of this sort lies at the heart, not only of
Boltzmann’s derivation of the Boltzmann equation, but also of modern
studies of the process of equilibration.

We seem to have two rival approaches to the relation between the
thermodynamic arrow and the causal arrow: one that takes the thermodynamic
arrow to be prior, and grounds the causal arrow on the thermodynamic arrow,
and one that grounds the thermodynamic arrow on the causal arrow.

I will argue that these are only apparently rivals; the two arrows should
not be thought of as standing in any sort of grounding, or priority
relations. The thermodynamic arrow is a condition for the possibility of
causal relations, and the causal arrow explains the tendency of systems to
equilibrate. This is a vicious circularity only on a conception of
metaphysics that, I argue, should be rejected.
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