[PhilPhys] Next Week - Lunchtime Talks: Kareem Khalifa on 9/30 and Serife Tekin 10/3

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for
our Lunch Time Talks.  Attend in person, Room 1117 on the 11th floor of the
Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh or visit our live
stream on YouTube at *https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg>*.

*Lunch Time Talk – **Kareem Khalifa*
Tuesday, September 30 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/91581835765
Title: Unifying Sociological Race Theories
Abstract:
Among contemporary race theories in sociology, four currently enjoy
prominence: racial formation theories, relational race theories, theories
of structural racism, and theories of systemic racism*. *While these
theories are sometimes treated as competitors, I will argue that this is
largely mistaken. Instead, I argue that these ‘theories’ are more
profitably understood as models that are unified by a more general
theoretical framework. After presenting and defending this framework, I
discuss some of its philosophical and sociological consequences.

*Lunch Time Talk – **Serife Tekin*
Friday, October 3rd @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm
This talk will be available online:  Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/98621476430
*Title: *Reconfiguring Stability in Psychiatry:  Spraying the Self
Abstract:
Psychiatry is often portrayed as a fragmented science, encompassing diverse
explanatory frameworks from psychodynamic theories to biological psychiatry
and patient-centered models. Debates over its scientific legitimacy
frequently hinge on whether mental disorders are natural kinds—categories
that enable stable explanation, prediction, and intervention. Ian Hacking’s
notion of *looping effects* has been central to this discussion, suggesting
that human kinds such as schizophrenia or multiple personality disorder
change under classification, thereby undermining their stability. This has
fueled the view that psychiatry cannot claim the epistemic status of
sciences grounded in stable natural kinds. I argue that this conclusion
rests on an unduly narrow conception of stability, one tied to essentialist
or homeostatic property cluster accounts. Drawing on Hacking’s earlier work
in *Representing and Intervening*, I propose an alternative reading in
which stability is not an intrinsic property of kinds but a product of
successful intervention. Reconceptualizing psychiatric
practice—particularly therapeutic engagement with the self—as an
interventionist enterprise reveals a form of localized, practice-dependent
stability that supports psychiatry’s scientific legitimacy without
requiring reductionist unity. This reframing not only reconciles two
strands of Hacking’s thought but also foregrounds the epistemic role of the
self in psychiatric science.
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