[PhilPhys] 66th Annual Lecture Series - 1/30 Felipe De Brigard - 2/20 Rina Bliss - 3/20 Wayne C. Myrvold

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
presents, The Sixty-Sixth Annual Lecture Series. This is the Center’s
oldest program, it was established in 1960, the year when Adolf Grünbaum
founded the Center. Each year the series consists of six lectures, about
three quarters of which are given by philosophers, historians, and
scientists from other universities. Over the years most of the leading
philosophers of science have spoken in this series.



The Center for Philosophy of Science invites you to join us for our Annual
Lecture Series,* Friday afternoons at 3:30 EST*.  Attend in person, Room
1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning or visit our live
stream on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.



*Felipe De Brigard*

https://scholars.duke.edu/person/felipe.debrigard


*January 30  *

Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464



*Title:  Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference*

*Abstract:*

The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary
philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate
is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of
memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a
simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper
seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one
is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism
is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering
I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation
central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it
features in the causalism/simulationism debate.






<https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine>*Rina
Bliss*

https://sociology.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/core-department-faculty/core-department-faculty-member/1021-bliss-catherine


*February 20th*

 Zoom:   https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94981603060



*Title: What’s Real About Race? Untangling Science, Genetics, and Society*

*Abstract:*

Biologically, race is a fiction—but it is a fiction that has real social
consequences. In *What’s Real About Race?* sociologist Rina Bliss unpacks
how genetic and social research have perpetuated racial categories and
stereotypes. How, Bliss asks, did categories of race emerge and get
embedded in modern-day science? How did scientists begin misusing DNA
collections and genetic research stratified by race? Are there ethical ways
to consider race in scientific research? And the elephant in the room:
what, if anything, is real about race? Bliss offers a new conceptual
framework: race is not a genetic reality, but it is also not merely a
social construct; it is a social reality with a stark impact on our life
chances and health.




*Wayne C. Myrvold *

https://www.uwo.ca/philosophy/people/myrvold.html


*March 20th*
Zoom TBA

Title:  “No only to anti-realism”: Some skeptical thoughts on scientific
realism

Abstract:

Debates about scientific realism and anti-realism have been a prominent
part of the landscape of philosophy of science for the past few decades,
which have seen a proliferation scientific realisms and anti-realisms.
Nearly 40 years ago Howard Stein, from whom I borrow my title, added a
skeptical voice to these discussions, arguing that the issue between
scientific realists and its opponents had not been clearly drawn. This talk
takes up that skeptical thread. I will argue, first, for the modest
conclusion that we should believe whatever we have sufficiently good
evidence for. As this includes the existence of some things (including
atoms) that are not directly observable, this modest conclusion involves
rejection of any form of anti-realism that involves a prohibition against
accepting the existence of unobservable entities. A mere absence of a
prohibition, however, hardly deserves to be elevated into a philosophical
position, hence I don’t consider my view to be adding to the menagerie of
versions of “scientific realism.” I doubt that there is any defensible
position worthy of that name.
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